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IN MEMORIAL 
 
On May 23, 2003, 49-
year-old Ontario 
Provincial Police Senior 
Constable Phil Shrive 
died in hospital as a 
result of injuries he 
sustained in an on duty 
two-vehicle collision that occurred on May 16, 
2003.  
 
Constable Shrive began his policing career with 
the OPP in 1974. His most recent postings 
included West Carleton Detachment and upon its 
closing, he transferred to Renfrew Detachment in 
1999.  
 
Senior Constable Shrive was a dedicated officer 
who was well liked and respected by his peers and 
members of the community. He was also a Branch 
President of the Ontario 
Provincial Police Association 
working diligently on behalf of 
his fellow officers. He is 
survived by his wife and 4 
children. 
 
On June 10, 2003, 35-year-old RCMP Constable 
Ghislain Maurice of the Strathcona County RCMP 
Detachment in Edmonton, Alberta died just 
before 9 a.m. when his unmarked police cruiser 
collided with a gravel truck. The accident 
happened on Highway 21, just southeast of 
Sherwood Park. The driver of the truck was not 
seriously hurt.  
 
Cst. Maurice was on duty as a member of the 
detachment's Traffic Services Unit at the time 
of his death. He was a 14-year veteran of the  
 
 
force and is survived by his wife 
Kathy and their 3-year-old 
daughter Emilie. 
 
The above information was 
provided with the permission of 
the Officer Down Memorial Page: available at 
www.odmp.org/canada 
 
NEW STAFF MEMBERS AT 
POLICE ACADEMY 
 
The Police Academy is pleased 
to announce the arrival of a 
new firearms instructor and a 
new legal studies instructor to 
its recruit training staff.  
 
Sgt. Dave Schmirler is a 17-year police veteran 
who started his police career in 1986 with the 
New Westminster Police Service.  He transferred 
to the Abbotsford Police Department in 1995.  He 
has been a tactical unit operator (ERT) for 15-
years with both New Westminster and 
Abbotsford and is the founding member and first 
serving president of the British Columbia Tactical 
Officers Association.  Sgt. Schmirler has been a 
competitive IPSC shooter in the past and has 
been a firearm’s trainer and transition instructor 
for about 12 years.  Prior to coming to the Police 
Academy he was assigned as a Detective to the 
General Investigative Section in Abbotsford and 
has prior experience in the Drug Section, Street 
Crime Unit, and as a certified Field Training 
Officer.   
 
Sgt. Kelly Seib is a 10-year police officer who 
started her career in 1993 with the Delta Police 
Department. Prior to policing she lived on 
hool  Vancouver Island where she taught Middle Sc
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in the Saanich School District. Sgt. Seib recently 
completed a four-year Detective assignment in 
the General Investigation Unit where she 
specialized in investigations pertaining to Sexual 
Assaults and Child Abuse. She also Coordinated 
the Department’s Violent Crimes Linkage Analysis 
System (ViCLAS) throughout her tenure as a 
Detective. 
 
Welcome aboard!!! 
 
QUALITY  & CLARITY OF 
VIDEO IMAGES RAISES A 
REASONABLE DOUBT 
R. v. Moyou, 2003 BCPC 0063 
 
Following a bank robbery, the 
police created wanted posters 
using images of the suspect 
obtained from the bank’s 
surveillance videotapes that 
recorded the incident. As a consequence, three 
correctional officers recognized the suspect in 
the wanted posters as the accused. A photograph 
of the accused taken at the time of his release 
from the correctional facility was then used by 
the police in a photo line up and was shown to the 
employees of the bank. The line up consisted of 6 
photos presented as a package and the accused 
was the only native person in the line up. Four of 
seven employees shown the line up selected the 
accused in varying degrees of certainty and a 
robbery charge was laid against the accused. At 
trial, the accused denied the robbery. However, 
all four employees made in-court identifications 
of him and the correctional officers identified 
the accused from the videotaped images shown in 
court. No circumstantial or forensic evidence was 
presented. Thus, identification became the sole 
issue.  
 
The Crown’s case of identification relied on the 
following: 
 
• the identification by the parole officers of 
the person in the wanted posters;  
• the photo line up identification by the four 
bank employees; and   
 
• the identification of the accused by the bank 
employees and the correctional employees 
from the videotape images shown at trial. 
 
British Columbia Provincial Court Justice Yee 
found there was a reasonable doubt respecting 
the identity of the accused as the perpetrator of 
the robbery. His identification as the robber was 
made from a correctional photograph, not from 
the videotape image itself. If the correctional 
officers were wrong about their recognition of 
the accused from the wanted posters, the 
identification chain would be broken and the 
photo line up evidence would be meaningless. 
Although there was no doubt that the 
correctional officers were honest and many of 
the features of the robber in the video and the 
accused’s photo used in the line up were similar, 
the quality and clarity of the videotape images 
left a reasonable doubt in the Court’s view. 
Justice Yee stated: 
 
The videotape captured mostly an overview of 
staggered images of the robbery. Most of the 
recorded images were out of focus. For the most 
part, the recording of the interactions between 
the robber and the bank tellers coincide with the 
numberings on the videotape and thus made it very 
difficult to see. Other than five waist high shots 
of the robber, there were no close up shots on the 
face. Of those five shots, only three could possibly 
be used for identification purposes. Furthermore, 
the robber was wearing a baseball-cap which not 
only covered up the forehead but also caused a 
shadow over the eyes and parts of his face. All 
these make identification of the robber from the 
images on the videotape exceedingly difficult. 
Since the pictures in the wanted poster came from 
the videotape images, the difficulty persists. 
 
Complete case available at www.provincialcourt.bc.ca 
 
Note-able Quote 
 
Admission of ignorance is often the first step in 
our education—Dr. Stephen R. Covey 2
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2004 POLICE LEADERSHIP 
CONFERENCE 
APRIL 5-7, 2004 
 
Mark your calendar! The British 
Columbia Association of Chief's 
of Police, as the major sponsor, 
along with the Ministry of Public 
Safety and Solicitor General and 
the Justice Institute of British Columbia will be 
hosting the "Police Leadership 2004 Conference" 
April 5 to 7, 2004 at the Westin Bayshore in 
beautiful Vancouver, British Columbia.  
 
The conference will emphasize leadership as an 
activity, not a position, and provide an opportunity 
for participants of all ranks from police agencies 
across Canada, the United States, and beyond to 
involve themselves in leadership initiatives. A 
carefully chosen list of speakers will provide a 
first class opportunity to hear some of the 
world's outstanding authorities on leadership.  
 
For more updates on this conference as they 
develop, please bookmark: 
 
www.policeleadership.org 
 
NEW (PROPOSED) 
LAWS  UPDATE 
 
There are several new Bills 
before Parliament that may 
impact police officers and how 
we do our job. These Bills include 
C-32 and C-38. 
 
Bill C-32 (first reading only: April 11, 2003) 
 
Use of Force on Aircraft 
 
A new law has been 
introduced that would permit 
the use of force by persons 
(pilots, staff, or passengers) on an aircraft to use 
reasonable force to prevent the commission of an 
offence that would likely injure the aircraft or a 
person or property on board it: 
 
s.27.1 Criminal Code (proposed) 
(1) Every person on an aircraft in flight is justified in 
using as much force as is reasonably necessary to 
prevent the commission of an offence against this 
Act or another Act of Parliament that the person 
believes on reasonable grounds, if it were 
committed, would be likely to cause immediate and 
serious injury to the aircraft or to any person or 
property therein.  
(2) This section applies in respect of any aircraft in 
flight in Canadian airspace and in respect of any 
aircraft registered in Canada in accordance with the 
regulations made under the Aeronautics Act in 
flight outside Canadian airspace. 
 
Application for Weapons Warrant to Seize 
 
In response to the Ontario Court of appeal ruling 
in R. v. Hurrell (2002) Docket:C36968 (OntCA) 
finding s.117.04 of the Criminal Code 
unconstitutional, a newly worded section has been 
proposed. In the current wording of the Code, 
the section does not require reasonable grounds 
to believe that weapons or other items sought are 
likely to be found on the person or premises o be 
searched. In the proposed new section, the 
justice requires reasonable grounds to believe 
that a person possesses one 
of the specified items in a 
building, receptacle, or place 
and it is not desirable for 
them to possess the items. 
 
s.117.04(1) Criminal Code (proposed) 
Where, pursuant to an application made by a peace 
officer with respect to any person, a justice is 
satisfied by information on oath that there are 
reasonable grounds to believe that the person 
possesses a weapon, a prohibited device, ammunition, 
prohibited ammunition or an explosive substance in a 
building, receptacle or place and that it is not desirable 
in the interests of the safety of the person, or of any 
other person, for the person to possess the weapon, 
prohibited device, ammunition, prohibited ammunition 
or explosive substance, the justice may issue a warrant 
authorizing a peace officer to search the building, 
receptacle or place and seize any such thing, and any 
authorization, licence or registration certificate 
relating to any such thing, that is held by or in the 
possession of the person. 3
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Subsection (2) remains unchanged. Warrantless 
searches in exigent circumstances are still 
permissible provided the pre-conditions in 
s.117.04(1) are satisfied. 
 
Traps Likely to Cause Bodily Harm 
 
A new section outlawing 
the use of deadly traps in 
places used to commit 
offences has been 
introduced in parliament. 
Canada’s Minister of Justice Martin Cauchon 
stated: 
 
We have to protect emergency workers like fire 
fighters on the front line who may be exposed to 
dangerous situations like marijuana grow operations 
or clandestine drug labs. The nature of these 
criminal activities creates a risk of fire, with 
volatile chemicals used in drug labs and electric 
power stolen through unsafe meter bypasses. If 
fire fighters or police officers are put at risk, 
injured or killed by traps set to defend these 
criminal enterprises from law enforcement or rival 
gangs, those who set the traps must feel the full 
weight of the law. 
 
s.247 Criminal Code (proposed) 
(1) Every one is guilty of an indictable offence and is 
liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five 
years, who with intent to cause death or bodily harm 
to a person, whether ascertained or not, (a ) sets or 
places a trap, device or other thing that is likely to 
cause death or bodily harm to a person; or (b ) being 
in occupation or possession of a place, knowingly 
permits such a trap, device or other thing to remain 
in that place. 
(2) Every one who commits an offence under subsection 
(1) and thereby causes bodily harm to any other 
person is guilty of an indictable offence and liable 
to imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years.  
(3) Every one who commits an offence under subsection 
(1), in a place kept or used for the purpose of 
committing another indictable offence, is guilty of 
an indictable offence and is liable to a term of 
imprisonment not exceeding ten years.  
(4) Every one who commits an offence under subsection 
(1), in a place kept or used for the purpose of 
committing another indictable offence, and thereby 
causes bodily harm to a person is guilty of an 
indictable offence and liable to a term of 
imprisonment not exceeding fourteen years.  
(5) Every one who commits an offence under subsection 
(1) and thereby causes the death of any other 
person is guilty of an indictable offence and liable 
to imprisonment for life. 
 
Bill C-38 (first reading only: May 27, 2003) 
 
Several amendments to the 
Controlled Drugs and 
Substances Act (CDSA) have 
also been introduced. These 
proposed changes include 
reducing the maximum 
punishment, by fine only, and the possibility of 
“ticketing” processes for minor marihuana 
possession offences. Penalties for growing 
marihuana would be increased. Canada’s Minister 
of Justice Martin Cauchon stated: 
 
These legislative reforms will ensure that our 
possession laws can be enforced more effectively 
across Canada while at the same time toughen 
penalties against cannabis grow operators. Our 
message to Canadians and especially our young 
people is clear - marijuana is harmful and it will 
remain illegal. 
 
Production Offences 
 
In its bid to toughen 
penalties against marihuana 
growers, Parliament is 
proposing to double the 
current maximum sentence 
(proposed s.7(2) CDSA). 
Under the present law of 
producing marihuana (which 
includes cultivating, 
propagating, or harvesting 
the substance), a convicted 
grower can only receive a maximum of 7 years in 
prison. Under the new proposal, maximum 
sentences are based on the number of marihuana 
plants grown. The following sentencing grid shows 
the corresponding penalty attached to the 
number of plants:    4
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Possession Offences 
 
This new legislation will “de-criminalize”, but not 
“de-legalize”, possession of small amounts of 
marihuana. Therefore, enforcement action can still 
be taken. Possession of amounts less than 30 grms. 
of marihuana or less than 1 gram of hashish remain 
summary conviction only offences. However, 
maximum penalties for these offences have been 
reduced in some cases. 
 
Offence Drug Amount Max. punishment 
s.4(5) CDSA 
summary only 
hashish 
< 1 grm.  
Adult = $300 fine 
YO = $200 fine 
s.4(5.1) CDSA 
summary only 
marihuana 
< 15 grms.  
Adult = $150 fine 
YO = $100 fine 
s.4(5.2) CDSA 
summary only 
 
If person in 
possession of < 1 
grm. of hashish 
or <  15 grms. of 
marihuana is 
operating or in 
care & control of 
a 
• motor vehicle 
• railway equip. 
• aircraft, or 
• vessel  
Adult = $400 fine 
YO = $250 fine 
s.4(5.4) CDSA 
summary only 
marihuana 
more than 15 
grms., but not 
more than 30 
grms. 
Option 
< $1000 fine and/ 
or 6 months in 
prison 
 
Contraventions 
Act process: 
Adult = $300 fine 
YO = $200 fine 
 
Marihuana amounts in excess of 30 grams or 
hashish amounts in excess of 1 gram will continue 
to be a dual offence. If possession of these 
amounts proceeds by indictment, the maximum 
punishment available is imprisonment for a term 
not exceeding 5 years less a day. If the offence 
is proceeded summarily, a first offence can draw 
up to 6 months in prison and/or a $1000 fine 
while a second or subsequent offences can bring 
up to one year in prison and/or a $2000 fine. 
 
Sentencing Reasons 
 
A new section will place an affirmative duty on 
judges in some cases to justify why a person is 
not sent to jail (proposed s.10(2.1) CDSA). If an 
accused is convicted of a production offence 
where 4 or more plants are involved, but is not 
sentenced to imprisonment, the Court must give 
reasons why if: 
 
• the accused used real property belonging to a 
3rd party to commit the offence; 
• the production was a potential security, 
health, or safety hazard to children at the 
location or in the immediate area; 
• the production was a potential public safety 
hazard in a residential area; or 
• the location was  set with a trap or other 
device likely to cause death or bodily harm. 
 
Complete copies of these and other proposed 
Bills are available at www.parl.gc.ca  
 
TAXI PASSENGER NOT 
NECESSARILY DETAINED WHEN 
DRIVER STOPPED 
R. v. Charles,  
[2003] O.J. N0. 1186 (OntCJ) 
 
Two police officers were on 
patrol in an area known for drug 
transactions when they observed 
a male (not the accused) enter a 
taxi facing the wrong way on a 
one-way street and the taxi drive off, going the 
wrong way. The police followed the cab and 
stopped it a short distance away. As the driver 
# of plants Offence type Punishment 
1-3 Summary only < $5000 fine and/or 
< 1 year in prison 
4-25 Dual by indictment 
• < 5 yrs. prison 
by summary  
• < $25,000 and/or 
• < 18 months prison 
26-50 Indictable < 10 yrs. prison 
51+ Indictable < 14 yrs. prison 5
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got out of the vehicle he was told to get back in. 
As police approached the tax, they noticed the 
accused, a passenger, reach into his waistband. In 
response to the question what he was doing in 
town, the accused replied he was with his buddy. 
He verbally identified himself when requested 
and his cell phone, which flashed several times, 
went unanswered. He would just hang up 
repeatedly.  
 
Before a CPIC return on the accused’s 
identification, he was asked whether he had any 
outstanding charges. The accused replied he was 
recently released from jail for possession of 
cocaine and careless driving. At this point, the 
accused was arrested for possession of a 
narcotic, read his rights to counsel and provided 
the caution. He stated he had an “8-ball”, but 
that he had swallowed it. The accused was 
searched and drugs were found. The accused ran 
from police but was tackled a short distance 
away. While trying to subdue him, the officer put 
the drugs down. The accused took the drugs, 
placed them his mouth, and tried to swallow. The 
officer grabbed him so he could not swallow. This 
to prevent the accused from dying and to 
preserve the evidence.  
 
The accused brought an application in the Ontario 
Court of Justice seeking the evidence 
(statements made and crack cocaine seized) be 
excluded under s.24(2) of the Charter. He argued 
that his rights under s.8 (search and seizure), s.9 
(arbitrary detention), and s.10(b) (right to 
counsel) had been violated.  
 
Was there a Detention 
 
Justice Mocha of the Ontario Court of Justice 
concluded that the accused, a passenger in the 
taxi, was not detained, either physically or 
psychologically. There were no demands or 
threats made to him; he was simply asked 
questions in a polite and non-intimidating manner. 
“Although [the accused] was being questioned by 
a police officer, there was nothing about the 
circumstances, the manner in which he was 
questioned, or the officer’s behaviour that 
indicated he had assumed control over the 
movements of [the accused].” The taxi driver was 
stopped by police for a Highway Traffic Act 
offence and “the stopping of the driver does not 
equate to detention of a passenger unless there is 
something more to indicate detention.”  
 
Since there was no detention, there was no 
obligation to inform the accused of his right to 
counsel prior to his arrest nor was it necessary to 
assess its arbitrariness. Even if there had been a 
detention, it would not have been arbitrary 
because the officer had an articulable cause. 
 
The Search 
 
Justice Mocha concluded that the search was 
reasonable and did not constitute a s.8 Charter 
violation: 
 
That leads me to the section 8 argument which is 
that [the officer] did not have objectively 
reasonable grounds to believe [the accused] was in 
possession of a narcotic and therefore the arrest 
was unlawful.  I find the totality of the 
circumstances provide objectively reasonably 
grounds for a lawful arrest.  They include:  the 
location being a well-known drug area, the unusual 
movements of the taxi, the gesture to the 
waistband, the cell phone and the prior record for 
possession of a narcotic.  I find the arrest was 
lawful and the search incident to that arrest was 
reasonable.  The fact that [the officer] did not 
search his waistband first does not cause me 
concern about his credibility nor does it affect the 
reasonableness of the search.  I also find that the 
questioning by [the officer] did not constitute a 
search. Consequently, there has been no violation 
of the applicant's rights under section 8 of the 
Charter. 
 
DID YOU KNOW… 
 
…that s. 7 of British 
Columbia’s Offence Act 
requires the police to 
provide a person taken into 
custody to at least one 
private telephone call, on 
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their request, during the first 12 hours of their 
custody. This "one call" does not appear to be 
limited to counsel, but might include other 
persons the arrestee wishes to communicate with. 
 
s.7 Offence Act 
(1) Every person who is taken into custody by a peace 
officer is entitled, on request to the person 
responsible for his or her custody, to have access 
to, and the private use of, a telephone as soon as 
possible at least once during the first 12 hours of 
his or her custody. 
(2) A person who, without reasonable excuse, hinders 
or prevents a person in custody from exercising 
the right granted by subsection (1), commits an 
offence. 
 
CLASS 90 GRADUATES 
 
The Police Academy is pleased to 
announce the successful graduation 
of recruit Class 90 as qualified 
municipal constables on May 9, 
2003. 
 
DELTA 
Cst. Jody Ackerman 
Cst. Russell Eke 
Cst. Kevin Hilliard 
Cst. Garth Hoffman 
Cst. Lauren Koop 
Cst. James Sanberg 
Cst. Harbinder Sidhu 
 
 
NEW WESTMINSTER  
Cst. Robert Boyd 
 
 
WEST VANCOUVER 
Cst. Brian Wong 
VANCOUVER 
Cst. Melissa Apcar 
Cst. Stuart Black 
Cst. Kenneth Fincham 
Cst. James Hooper 
Cst. Lisa Horne 
Cst. Jonathan Kempton 
Cst. Mike Loeppky 
Cst. Scott Maden 
Cst. Troy Peters 
Cst. Tracey Prentice 
Cst. Michael Ritchie 
Cst. Shawn Robson 
Cst. Aman Samra 
Cst. Kenneth Stanworth 
Cst. Jason Tremblay 
Cst. Norman Yee 
 
Congratulations to Cst. Garth 
Hoffman (Delta), who was the 
recipient of the British Columbia 
Association of Chiefs of Police 
Shield of Merit for best all around 
recruit performance in basic training. Cst. 
Hoffman also received the Abbotsford Police 
Association Oliver Thomson Trophy for 
outstanding physical fitness. Cst. Kenneth 
Stanworth (Vancouver) received the Vancouver 
Police Union Excellence in Academics award for 
best academic test results in all disciplines. Cst. 
Shawn Robson (Vancouver) received the British 
Columbia Federation of Police Officers 
Valedictorian award for being selected by his 
peers to represent his class at the graduation 
ceremony. Cst. James Sandberg (Delta) was the 
recipient of the Abbotsford Police Recruit 
Marksmanship award for highest qualification 
score during Block 3 training (48/50). Mr. Dirk 
Ryneveld, Q.C., the British Columbia Police 
Complaint Commissioner, was the keynote speaker 
at the ceremony. 
 
FAILING TO ASK ABOUT 
SUCCESS IN CONTACTING 
COUNSEL VIOLATES CHARTER 
RIGHT  
R. v. Rezanoff, 2003 ABQB 292 
 
The accused was arrested for 
impaired care and control, and 
consuming alcohol in a vehicle 
after a police officer saw him 
sitting in the driver’s seat of a semi trailer truck, 
start it, and turn the lights on.  He was informed 
of his right to counsel, cautioned, and read the 
breath demand. The accused agreed to accompany 
the officer to the police station so he could seek 
advice from a lawyer. At the station the accused 
asked to speak to a lawyer and was brought to a 
telephone room where he remained for 7 minutes. 
The officer saw him on the phone part of this 
time and when he was finished, the accused was 
escorted to the breathalyzer room where he 
refused to provide a breath sample. At trial in 
Alberta Provincial Court, the accused was 
convicted of failing to provide a breath sample.  
 
The accused appealed to the Alberta Court of 
Queen’s Bench arguing that his s.10(b) Charter 7
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"peace officer" includes…(c) a
police officer, police constable,
bailiff, constable, or other
person employed for the
preservation and maintenance of
the public peace or for the
service or execution of civil
process, 
right to counsel had been breached because he 
did not get legal advice from a lawyer during the 
7 minute period. Section 10 requires that once an 
arrestee indicates a desire to contact a lawyer, 
the police must provide a reasonable opportunity 
to do so and must also refrain from eliciting 
evidence until the opportunity has been provided. 
Justice Macklin accepted the accused’s argument, 
stating: 
 
In the particular circumstances of this case, I am 
satisfied that seven minutes in a 
telephone room at 1: 20 a. m. is not a reasonable 
opportunity to exercise one's right to contact 
counsel. The first implementational duty [providing 
a reasonable opportunity] was breached, and an 
infringement of the [accused’s] rights has been 
made out. I am also satisfied that the [accused] 
was as reasonably diligent as he could be during 
that time span in trying to call a lawyer or someone 
who could provide him with the advice he was 
seeking.   
 
Given the peculiar circumstances of this case and 
the brief period the appellant had to 
contact counsel and both instruct and obtain 
advice from counsel, [the officer] 
should have, at the very least, asked the appellant 
at 1: 27 if he was successful in contacting a lawyer 
or obtaining advice. …. In this case, as I have 
stated, the [accused] did not have a reasonable 
opportunity to contact counsel. Had [the arresting 
officer] simply asked the question as to whether 
counsel had been contacted, he could then have 
taken steps to ensure that a reasonable 
opportunity to do so was then afforded to the 
[accused]. [references omitted] 
 
And further: 
 
In this case, [the arresting officer] did not ask 
whether counsel had been contacted. 
Had he done so, he could have determined whether 
or not further reasonable opportunity must be 
given or, alternatively, whether the [accused] was 
waiving his right to counsel, which would have 
triggered the additional informational requirement 
[of the police obligation to hold off from eliciting 
incriminatory evidence].  
 
The accused had established on a balance of 
probabilities that his right protected under 
s.10(b) had been infringed and the evidence of 
the refusal was inadmissible. The appeal was 
allowed and an acquittal entered. 
 
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca 
 
s.495 CRIMINAL CODE POLICE 
POWERS OF ARREST IN 
REVIEW 
Sgt. Mike Novakowski 
 
The Criminal Code defines a peace officer in s.2: 
 
This section does not create a police force, but 
provides that persons deriving their authority 
from other sources be treated as "peace officers" 
enabling them to enforce the Criminal Code within 
the scope of their pre-existing authority and to 
benefit from certain protections granted only to 
peace officers1.  The general power of arrest for 
peace officers is found in section 495(1) of the  
Criminal Code:  
 
s.495(1) Criminal Code 
A peace officer may arrest without warrant 
(a) a person who has committed an indictable 
offence or who, on reasonable grounds, he  
believes has committed or is about to commit an 
indictable offence; 
(b) a person whom he finds committing a criminal 
offence; or 
(c) a person in respect of whom he has reasonable 
grounds to believe that a warrant of arrest   or 
committal, in any form set out in Part XXVIII in 
relation thereto, is in force within the 
territorial jurisdiction in which the person is 
found. 
                                                  8
1 Nolan v. the Queen (1987) 34 C.C.C. (3d) 289 (S.C.C.) at p.298. 
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By application of the Interpretation Act, this 
power of arrest extends to all federal statutes 
that create offences, but do not create their own 
arrest powers2: 
 
s.34(2) Interpretation Act 
All the provisions of the Criminal Code relating to 
indictable offences apply to indictable offences 
created by an enactment, and all the provisions of that 
Code relating to summary conviction offences apply to 
all other offences created by an enactment, except to 
the extent that the enactment otherwise provides. 
 
For example, the Controlled Drugs and Substances 
Act (CDSA) creates many drug related offences 
however there are no arrest powers within the 
CDSA. Thus, the police may use the general arrest 
powers found in s.495 of the Code to arrest for 
CDSA offences. 
 
Disjunctively read, s.495 permits arrest without 
warrant under the following five circumstances: 
 
1. a person who has committed an indictable 
offence; 
2. a person the peace officer believes on 
reasonable grounds has committed an 
indictable offence; 
3. a person the peace officer believes on 
reasonable grounds is about to commit an 
indictable offence; 
4. a person the peace officer finds committing a 
criminal offence; or 
5. a person the peace officer believes on 
reasonable grounds is the subject of a warrant 
of arrest or committal that is in force within 
the territorial jurisdiction in which the person 
is found. 
 
Has Committed an Indictable Offence 
 
This provision is found in s. 495(1)(a) and covers a 
situation where the peace officer has personal 
knowledge that the person has committed an 
indictable offence:   
 
s.495(1)(a) Criminal Code 
A peace officer may arrest without warrant…a person 
who has committed an indictable offence… 
                                                 
2 See for example R. v. Bienvenue (2001) 155 C.C.C. (3d) 442 (Que. C.A.) 
 “has committed” means the arresting officer has 
personal knowledge of the offence. This may 
require that the offence was committed in the 
officer's presence and observed by them. In R. v. 
Klimchuk (1991) 67 C.C.C (3d) 385 (B.C.C.A.), 
Justice Wood of the British Columbia Court of 
Appeal stated: 
 
Looking in particular at the first part of s.495(1)(a), 
a peace officer is entitled to arrest a person who 
has committed an indictable offence. Before such an 
arrest can be made, the peace officer must know 
that the arrestee has committed an indictable 
offence. In order for him to know that, he must 
have witnessed the indictable offence occurring. 
Correctly construed, then, this first part of the 
provision covers those few situations where the 
arresting officer, having personally witnessed the 
commission of an indictable offence could not 
prevent it or perfect an arrest before its 
completion. 
  
 “indictable offence” includes both strictly 
indictable offences and dual procedure offences. 
 
s.34(1) Interpretation Act 
 Where an enactment creates an offence, (a) the 
offence is deemed to be an indictable offence if the 
enactment provides that the offender may be 
prosecuted for the offence by indictment;… 
 
Believes on Reasonable Grounds Has 
Committed an Indictable Offence 
 
This provision is also found in s. 495(1)(a) of the 
Criminal Code and covers the situation where the 
peace officer has reasonable grounds to believe 
that an indictable offence has been committed. 
  
s. 495(1)(a) Criminal Code 
A peace officer may arrest without warrant…a person… 
who, on reasonable grounds, he believes has 
committed… an indictable offence… 
 
In R. v. Biron (1976) 2 S.C.R. 56 (S.C.C.), Justice 
Martland for the majority of the Supreme Court 
of Canada stated: 
 
This paragraph, limited in its application to 
indictable offences, deals with the situation in 
which an offence has already been committed… The 
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peace officer is not present at its commission. He 
may have to rely upon information received from 
others. The paragraph therefore enables him to act 
on his belief, if based on [reasonable] grounds. 
 
“reasonable grounds to believe” means the facts 
within the officer's knowledge would satisfy a 
reasonable person standing in the shoes of the 
officer that there is reason to believe that the 
person has committed an indictable offence. 
 
The police officer does not have to have personally 
witnessed an indictable offence, but must possess 
reasonable grounds to believe that an indictable 
offence has been committed. The reasonable 
grounds for belief could be a combination of 
observations, information, and experience. Even if 
it turns out that the person is later acquitted of 
the charge, the acquittal does not render the 
arrest unlawful, as long as there were reasonable 
grounds upon which the police officer acted3. Of 
course, the arresting officer must be able to 
articulate and explain those grounds in order to 
justify the arrest.  This underscores the 
importance of accurate, timely, and detailed note-
taking. 
 
 “indictable offence” includes both strictly 
indictable offences and dual offences4. 
 
Believes on Reasonable Grounds is about 
to Commit an Indictable Offence 
 
This provision, also found in s. 495(1)(a) of the 
Criminal Code, applies to circumstances where a 
peace officer has reasonable grounds to believe 
that the person is about to commit an indictable 
offence.   
 
s.495(1)(a) Criminal Code 
A peace officer may arrest without warrant (a) a 
person… who, on reasonable grounds, he believes … is 
about to commit an indictable offence… 
 
This section provides the power to arrest someone 
for an apprehended or probable future indictable 
offence. To properly invoke this authority, "the 
                                                 
3 See R. v. McKibbon (1973) 12 C.C.C. (2d) 66 (B.C.C.A.) 
4 see s.34(1) Criminal Code 
police officer must have reasonable grounds for 
believing that the anticipated conduct,…the 
commission of an indictable offence, will likely 
occur if the person is not detained"5.  
 
This provision does not create an offence but 
allows for an arrest as a preventative (non-
retributive) measure.  An arrest in this case 
prevents the probability of the person committing 
an offence which the peace officer reasonably 
believes would be committed if the arrest does not 
take place.  For example, in R. v. Beaudette (1957) 
118 C.C.C. 295 (Ont.C.A.), the court upheld the 
conviction of an accused on a charge of resisting 
arrest after he was arrested because he was 
intoxicated and the police believed he was 
intending to drive a motor vehicle when he was 
observed leaving a liquor establishment.. 
 
However, since the person has not committed an 
offence, the person must be unconditionally 
released as soon as practicable after either the 
peace officer or the officer in charge is satisfied 
that the continued detention of that person in 
custody is no longer necessary in order to prevent 
the commission of the indictable offence.  This 
release is required pursuant to the provisions of 
s.503(4) of the Criminal Code.   
 
s. 503(4) Criminal Code 
 A peace officer or an officer in charge having the 
custody of a person who has been arrested without 
warrant as a person about to commit an indictable 
offence shall release that person unconditionally as 
soon as practicable after he is satisfied that the 
continued detention of that person in custody is no 
longer necessary in order to prevent the commission 
by him of an indictable offence. 
 
This preventative arrest provision may be useful, 
particularly in volatile circumstances such as 
domestic situations or bar disturbances where, 
upon police attendance, no criminal offence has yet 
taken place.  In many of these situations, an 
aggressive party may be under the influence of 
alcohol and agitated, and leaving them in the 
                                                 
5 Brown v. Durham (Regional Municipality) Police Force (1998) 43 O.R. (3d) 223 
(Ont.C.A.) appeal to S.C.C. granted [1999] S.C.C.A. No. 87 
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circumstance would almost certainly result in an 
assault.  If alternative measures do not diffuse 
the situation, this provision provides the police 
with the authority to take a preventative measure 
in arresting and  removing the aggressor, provided 
the requisite grounds for belief exist. 
 
However, if there are reasonable grounds to 
believe that an indictable offence has been 
committed (e.g. a threatening or an assault), then 
the person may be arrested for that substantive 
offence. By arresting for the substantive offence, 
the person may be detained by the police where 
pre-trial conditions of release may be imposed, 
such as no contact orders, non attendance orders, 
or alcohol prohibitions. It must be remembered 
that a person arrested only on the preventative 
authority as a person about to commit an indictable 
offence must be released unconditionally, and 
therefore no conditions of release may be 
imposed6.  
 
“indictable offence” includes both strictly 
indictable offences and dual offences7. 
 
Finds Committing a Criminal Offence 
 
This provision is found in s. 495(1)(b) of the 
Criminal Code and applies to circumstances where a 
peace officer finds a person committing a criminal 
offence.   
 
s. 495(1)(b) Criminal Code 
A peace officer may arrest without a warrant…(b) a 
person whom he finds committing a criminal offence,  
 
"finds committing" has been both strictly and 
liberally interpreted by the courts. Strictly 
speaking, in R. v. Biron, Justice Martland stated: 
 
Paragraph (b) applies in relation to any criminal 
offence and it deals with the situation in which the 
peace officer himself finds an offence being 
committed. His power to arrest is based upon his 
own observation. Because it is based on his own 
discovery of an offence actually being committed 
                                                 
6 Unless of course, while being detained, the police lay a s.810 Criminal Code 
information seeking a recognizance. 
7 see s.34(1) Criminal Code 
there is no reason to refer to a belief based upon 
reasonable grounds. 
 
Furthermore, "the validity of an arrest under this 
paragraph must be determined in relation to the 
circumstances which were apparent to the peace 
officer at the time the arrest was made"8. In the 
event the person arrested is later acquitted, the 
police will nonetheless be protected from liability 
of false arrest, assault etc., as long as the officer 
had reasonable grounds to believe that the person 
was apparently committing a criminal offence at 
the time of their arrest9.  To do otherwise would 
mean that, absent a conviction, a peace officer 
could not be certain that an offence had been 
committed and could not arrest in such 
circumstances10. Simply stated "the power to 
arrest without warrant is given where the peace 
officer [themselves] finds a situation in which a 
person is apparently committing an offence11". In 
other words, this provision could be interpreted as 
requiring reasonable grounds to believe the person 
is committing a criminal offence. 
 
In addition to the strict interpretation of "finds 
committing" (actually witnessing the offence), a 
liberal interpretation of "finds committing" has 
been considered. In Frey v. Fedoruk, Stone and 
Watt (1949) 95 C.C.C. 206 (B.C.C.A.) reversed on 
other grounds (1950) 97 C.C.C. 1 (S.C.C.) the court 
found that a police officer who arrives on the 
scene shortly after an offence may subsequently 
make an arrest under this provision provided the 
arrest and the "seeing" are intimately connected. 
In this case a private person arrested the accused 
who was seen "peeping" in the windows of a house. 
Fifteen minutes later the officer arrived and 
subsequently arrested the accused without a 
warrant. British Columbia Court of Appeal Justice 
O'Halloran  opined at p.220/221: 
  
"[The authorities] establish that if the offender is 
seen doing the act by one person, he may be 
apprehended by another who did not see him doing 
                                                 
8 R. v. Biron  (1976) 2 S.C.R. 56 (S.C.C.) 
9 See Cluett v. the Queen (1985) 21 C.C.C. (3d) 318 (S.C.C.) 
10 See R. v. Biron (1976) 2 S.C.R. 56 (S.C.C.)  
11 Ibid. 
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the act, provided the arrest occurs in fresh pursuit, 
or in circumstances of a continuing nature with no 
break in the connection between the "seeing" and 
the arrest; it must constitute a continuance of the 
same transaction" 
 
In R. v. Pithpart (1987) 34 C.C.C. (3d) 150 
(B.C.Co.Crt), the accused was arrested by way of a 
police undercover team operation.  A plain-clothes 
officer made the initial contact with the accused, 
who offered her services as a prostitute to the 
plain clothes officer. The plain-clothes officer 
gave a pre-arranged signal to two officers in 
uniform who then made the arrest and took the 
accused down to police headquarters where she 
was detained in custody overnight.  In holding that 
the arresting officers found the prostitute 
committing the offence of soliciting, the Court 
found the commission of the offence and the 
arrest to have been part of a single transaction12.  
 
In Everywoman's Health Centre Society (1988) 
Victoria Drive Medical Clinic Ltd. v. Brydges [1989] 
B.C.J.  No. C886265 (B.C.S.C.), the Court reviewed 
the phrase "found violating" as it appeared in the 
terms of a court order. The order authorized the 
police to arrest "any persons found violating" its 
provisions. At issue was whether the phrase “found 
violating” empowered the police to arrest persons 
who were violating the order immediately prior to 
police arrival, but were not in violation at the 
moment of arrival. In this case, persons would 
block the entrance door to the centre in 
contravention of the court order, but at the time 
police arrived would no longer be blocking the door. 
British Columbia Supreme Court Justice Cohen, in 
citing Frey, stated: 
  
In my opinion, the words: "any person found violating 
any provision of paragraph (a) or (e) must, by law, be 
given their practical, sensible meaning as including 
violating conduct which takes place just before the 
police arrive at the scene. Of course, the police 
must, as is their normal practice, make reasonable 
enquiries to find reasonable and probable grounds to 
conclude that any person has recently violated the 
                                                 
12 In the alternative, the Court held the arresting officer was the agent of the plain-
clothes officer and therefore in law, the arrest was made by the plain-clothes officer. 
 
Order. If the police so find, then [the court order] 
justifies and requires the police to make an arrest. 
[emphasis added] 
 
“criminal offence”  means any  federal statute 
offence, including indictable, dual and summary 
conviction.  
 
This provision is the only peace officer warrantless 
power of arrest (outside s. 494(1)(b) of the 
Criminal Code), which covers summary conviction 
offences.  However, because there is no power of 
arrest for strictly summary conviction offences, 
unless they are found committing, the offender 
could still be charged with a summary offence.   
The officer must simply compel the person's court 
attendance through another method such as 
requesting a summons or the issuance of a warrant. 
 
Believes on Reasonable Grounds is the 
Subject of a Warrant  
 
Section. 495(1)(c) of the Criminal Code gives a 
peace officer the power to arrest anyone the 
peace officer has reasonable grounds to believe 
there is a warrant (of arrest or committal) in Part 
XXVIII of the Criminal Code in force in the 
jurisdiction in which the person is found.   An 
arrest under this section is authorized if there are 
reasonable grounds for believing a warrant is in 
force13. 
 
s. 495(1)(c) Criminal Code 
A peace officer may arrest without warrant…(c) a 
person in respect of whom he has reasonable grounds 
to believe that a warrant of arrest   or committal, in 
any form set out in Part XXVIII in relation thereto, 
is in force within the  territorial jurisdiction in which 
the person is found. 
 
“reasonable grounds to believe”  in the context 
of this provision means that the peace officer 
does not have to rely on the actual warrant being 
in hand as the authority for the arrest,  but can 
rely on reliable information (such as CPIC 
information, or information received from another 
police officer or the court) that the warrant 
                                                 
13 R. v. Dennis 2001 B.C.S.C. 615 at para 17. 
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exists. Although this arrest authority is 
warrantless, it is nonetheless predicated on a 
reasonably held belief that a warrant does exist. A 
warrant exists as soon as the judge makes it, even 
before the order is committed to writing14. 
 
“warrant” (arrest or committal) is a judicial order 
directed to peace officers to arrest a person and 
bring them before the court.  The warrant will 
have a specific radius of coverage (i.e. it will be in 
force only within a specified territorial 
jurisdiction—e.g. British Columbia radius, or 
Canada-wide, depending on the charge). Arrest or 
committal warrants should not be confused with 
search or entry warrants, or warrants issued under 
other federal or provincial statutes. 
 
“in force in the jurisdiction in which the person 
is found” means that the warrant must cover the 
territorial jurisdiction in which the person is 
arrested. This territorial or geographical area that 
an arrest warrant is executable will be dependent 
upon the provision that authorizes the issuance of 
the warrant. For example, a bench warrant issued 
for non-attendance at trial where an indictment 
has been preferred against an accused is 
executable anywhere in Canada (see s.597 Criminal 
Code).  Other warrants only carry with it the 
territorial jurisdiction of the justice, judge, or 
court that issues the warrant (see s.513 Criminal 
Code). 
 
However, the territorial radius of a warrant may 
be limited for public policy, practical, and 
administrative reasons by the Crown or police 
agency.   This is known as labeling15. The Crown and 
police set returnable radii for such reasons as the 
cost of physically returning the subject of a 
warrant to the jurisdiction for trial. This decision 
is often based on the seriousness of the offence.  
For practical purposes, police officers should 
respect the warrant radius stated in the CPIC 
entry. For example, if the suspect is found in 
Vancouver and the warrant has a British Columbia 
                                                 
14 See R. v. Gunn (1997) 113 C.C.C. (3d) 174 (Alta.C.A.)  application for leave to 
appeal dismissed [1997] S.C.C.A. No. 175 (S.C.C.). 
15 R. v Cardinal (1985) 21 C.C.C. (3d) 259 (Alta. C.A) 
radius, then that person can be arrested; however, 
if the warrant has a “Manitoba only” radius, then 
that person should not be arrested on the warrant 
in Vancouver or anywhere else in British Columbia.  
 
A police officer should always confirm with CPIC 
or the communications operator to determine the 
radius of the warrant before making the arrest. 
Furthermore, the warrant should be confirmed 
with the originating agency. In the event the 
subject of an arrest warrant is located outside the 
specified radius of the CPIC entry, a request can 
be made to the originating agency requesting an 
extension on the radius of the warrant. If the 
request is granted, follow up investigation can be 
made and the person subject to arrest at a later 
time. 
 
Although warrants may be “Canada Wide” because 
the Criminal Code permits judges elsewhere to 
“validate” or back warrants from other 
jurisdictions16, Crown Counsel retains the 
discretion to extend or reduce the radius of a 
warrant to meet the individual needs of a case.  
 
Protection from liability 
 
Provided a police officer acts in good faith, they 
will be protected from liability in the event that 
the warrant later turns out be defective:  
 
s.25(2) Criminal Code 
Where a person is required or authorized to execute a 
process…that person or any person who assists him is, if 
that person acts in good faith, justified in executing the 
process…notwithstanding that the process…is defective 
or that it was issued or imposed without jurisdiction or 
in excess of jurisdiction. 
 
Furthermore, if an officer makes an arrest 
pursuant to a warrant, but in fact arrests the 
wrong person, they will be protected from criminal 
liability if they were acting on reasonable grounds 
and in good faith that they had the right person:  
 
s.28(1) Criminal Code 
Where a person who is authorized to execute a 
warrant to arrest believes, in good faith and on 
                                                 
16 R. Cardinal (1985) 21 C.C.C. (3d) 254 (Alta. C.A.) 
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reasonable grounds, that the person whom he arrests is 
the person named in the warrant, he is protected from 
criminal responsibility in respect thereof to the same 
extent as if that person were the person named in the 
warrant. 
 
Duty to possess warrant 
 
Section 29(1) of the Criminal Code requires the 
police officer to have the warrant in possession, if 
feasible, and to produce the warrant if requested 
by the person.   
 
s. 29(1) Criminal Code 
It is the duty of every one who executes a process or 
warrant to have it with him, where it is feasible to do 
so, and to produce it when requested to do so. 
 
However, in many cases it will not be feasible, 
since the warrants are held on file within the 
police agency responsible for the investigation 
that led to the issuance of the warrant. For 
example, a routine CPIC query of a driver of a 
motor vehicle may indicate there is an 
outstanding warrant for their arrest.  The law 
does not require that the officer first obtain a 
copy of the warrant prior to executing it on the 
roadside. However, if the officer is executing a 
specific warrant and has the warrant in their 
possession at the time of service, the officer 
must produce the warrant when requested.  
 
LIMITATIONS ON ARREST  
 
Once a police officer has determined that the 
power of arrest under s.495(1) of the Criminal 
Code for an offence exists, a duty is imposed on 
the officer under s. 495(2) not to arrest in 
prescribed circumstances.  Therefore, even if the 
officer has the power of arrest under s. 495(1) of 
the Code, the officer will not necessarily exercise 
that power.  These limits recognize the need to 
prevent unnecessary pre-trial detention and the 
availability of less expensive and less onerous ways 
to compel an individual's appearance in court. This 
provision also establishes criteria, commonly 
referred to as “public interest” and “court 
appearance”, which must be considered in deciding 
whether to carry out the arrest. 
s.495(2) Criminal Code 
A peace officer shall not arrest a person without 
warrant for  
(a)  an indictable offence mentioned in section 553, 
(b) an offence for which the person may be 
prosecuted by indictment or for which he is  
punishable on summary conviction, or 
(c) an offence punishable on summary conviction, 
 in any case where 
(d) he believes on reasonable grounds that the public 
interest, having regard to all the circumstances 
including the need to 
(i) establish the identity of the person, 
(ii) secure or preserve evidence of or relating to 
the offence, or 
(iii) prevent the continuation or repetition of the 
offence or the commission of another  
offence, may be satisfied without so arresting 
the person, and 
(e)  he has no reasonable grounds to believe that, if 
he does not so arrest the person, the person will 
fail to attend court in order to be dealt with 
according to law.  
 
Shall Not Arrest 
 
“Shall not arrest” means that the peace officer 
must consider the limitations on arrest found in 
s.495(2) of the Criminal Code prior to arresting a 
person, and then refrain from arresting the person 
if an arrest is unnecessary having regard to the 
established criteria (i.e. public interest and court 
appearance). However, in many situations, the 
police officer will have to take physical custody of 
a person immediately upon arriving at a scene 
where the offender is still present.  Justification 
may include a necessity to gain control of an 
arrestee and establish a safe environment in which 
to conduct the investigation in determining 
whether public interest or court appearance is 
satisfied.  This will particularly be the case where 
the offence involved violence or where there is a 
perceived risk of the person fleeing the scene.   
 
In the event that the police officer makes an 
arrest at the scene for an offence to which 
s.495(2) applies, the officer must continually 
consider releasing the person if public interest is 
subsequently satisfied. Under subsections 497(1) 
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and (1.1) of the Criminal Code a police officer shall 
consider release when they arrest a person 
without a warrant for an indictable offence 
mentioned in s.553 (offences that are within the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the provincial court), a 
dual offence, or a summary conviction offence. In 
other words, if a police officer arrests a person 
under s.495(1) of the Code, s.497 requires the 
officer to consider releasing the person if the 
public interest and court appearance criteria are 
satisfied; if these criteria are met, the officer 
shall not continue the arrest and release the 
person. 
 
s.497 Criminal Code 
(1) Subject to subsection (1.1), if a peace officer 
arrests a person without warrant for an offence 
described in paragraph 496(a), (b) or (c), the peace 
officer shall, as soon as practicable, 
(a) release the person from custody with the 
intention of compelling their appearance by way of 
summons; or 
(b) issue an appearance notice to the person and then 
release them. 
(1.1) A peace officer shall not release a person under 
subsection (1) if the peace officer believes, on 
reasonable grounds, 
(a) that it is necessary in the public interest that the 
person be detained in custody or that the matter of  
their release from custody be dealt with under 
another provision of this Part, having regard to all the 
circumstances including the need to 
(i) establish the identity of the person, 
(ii) secure or preserve evidence of or relating to the 
offence, 
(iii) prevent the continuation or repetition of the 
offence or the commission of another  
offence, or 
(iv) ensure the safety and security of any victim of or 
witness to the offence; or 
(b) that if the person is released from custody, the 
person will fail to attend court in order to be dealt 
with according to law. 
 
The public interest provisions included in s.497 of 
the Code have been expanded upon by the addition 
of a fourth element; ensuring "the safety and 
security of any victim of or witness to the 
offence".  
 
PUBLIC INTEREST 
 
No narrow definition of "public interest" has been 
developed in law.  In order to determine whether 
the "public interest" would be satisfied by arrest 
or release, the peace officer must consider all the 
circumstances of the offence including, but not 
limited to17, those conditions referred to in 
s.495(2)(d) of the Criminal Code. 
 
s.495(2)(d) C.C.C. 
A peace officer shall not arrest…in any case where  
(d) he believes on reasonable grounds that the public 
interest, having regard to all the circumstances 
including the need to 
(i) establish the identity of the person, 
(ii) secure or preserve evidence of or relating to 
the offence, or 
(iii) prevent the continuation or repetition of the 
offence or the commission of another offence 
may be satisfied without so arresting the person 
 
Need to establish identity  
 
Police may arrest if it is necessary to establish 
identity18. The police officer must be satisfied 
that the suspect’s identity has been established, 
so that if an arrest is not perfected the person's 
attendance in court can be secured by a secondary 
method such as an appearance notice or summons. 
This is necessary to ensure that: 
 
• the charge will be laid against the correct 
individual; and 
• if the person fails to appear for court, a 
warrant for arrest may be issued. 
 
Moreover, "establishing  identity includes the 
steps necessary to identify in the future the 
person answering the charge in the court-room as 
the person" detained or arrested by the police at 
the time of the offence19. This may require the 
police officer verifying identity through 
photographic identification (ie. drivers license, 
passport, etc.), querying the individual on CPIC to 
                                                 
17 see R. v. Sieben (1989) 51 C.C.C. (3d) 343 (Alta.C.A.), Collins v. Brantford Police 
Services Board (2001) Docket: C34623 Ont. C.A. 
18 See R. v. Lavin (1992) 76 C.C.C. (3d) 279 per Tyndale J.A. at p.282. 
19 R. v. Dilling (1993) 84 C.C.C. (3d) 325 (B.C.C.A.) leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused 88 
C.C.C. (3d) vi (S.C.C.) 
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obtain previous criminal record20 and description, 
further investigation to determine other details of 
the individual such as physical characteristics (ie. 
height, weight, tattoos, marks, scars, etc.), place 
of residence, or other relevant matters for 
purposes of identification. It may be necessary in 
some cases to establish identity by fingerprinting 
the individual21. 
 
Need to secure or preserve evidence of or 
in relation to the offence  
 
This may require a search of the person or 
surroundings to discover, secure, or preserve 
evidence related to the arrest.  There may be a 
need to arrest the person for example, to search 
incidental to the arrest22.  Another example where 
arrest might be required would be to prevent the 
arrested person from interfering with the 
execution of a search warrant or a 
contemporaneous investigation that may require 
the discovery or preservation of evidence at a 
secondary location. An arrest may prevent the 
person from warning other persons yet to be 
arrested who may interfere with the investigation.  
 
Need to prevent the continuation or 
repetition of the offence or the commission 
of other offences 
 
An arrest may be required, for example, when the 
police officer finds a person committing an assault.  
Following intervention, if the police officer 
believes that the assault will be repeated if an 
arrest is not effected, an arrest is justified. In R. 
v. Venzi  [1997] B.C.J. No 3019 (B.C.S.C.), Justice 
Lamperson reviewed the application of s.495(2) of 
the Code with respect to an arrest for an assault 
which occurred in a domestic context. The Court 
found that "section 495(2) requires among other 
things that for a police officer not to arrest 
pursuant to s.495(1),  [they] must have reasonable 
                                                 
20 A person should have an intimate knowledge of their criminal history and 
therefore questioning them in regards to their record may assist in confirming 
their identity. 
21 See R. v. Higgins & Beare (1988) 45 C.C.C. (3d) 57 (S.C.C.). 
22 See R. v. Lavin (1992) 76 C.C.C. (3d) 279 (Que. C.A.) per Tyndale J.A. at p.282. 
grounds to believe that an offence will not 
reoccur". The Court further went on to state: 
 
Section 495(2) mandates that a police officer, who 
has [reasonable] grounds under s.495(1), must 
arrest unless he has [reasonable] grounds to believe 
that an arrest is not necessary for the protection 
of the public. In other words, if he does not have 
[reasonable] grounds to conclude that the 
respondent will not commit another offence then he 
must arrest. 
 
In R. v. McIntosh (1984) 29 M.V.R. 50 (B.C.C.A.), 
the British Columbia Court of Appeal examined the 
arrest of an impaired driver to determine whether 
it was made in compliance with the Criminal Code. 
Justice Esson, for the unanimous court, held: 
 
The burden upon the Crown was not to establish 
that the accused would have driven his car. The 
officer…rightly viewed the question as whether 
there was a risk of that occurring or, to look at it 
the other way, whether the officer could be certain 
that it would not occur. It does not matter that the 
risk, in statistical terms may have been small.  
 
In R. v. Ware (1987) 49 M.V.R. 97 (B.C.Co.Crt.), 
another impaired driving case, Justice Lamperson 
reviewed applicable cases on public interest and 
stated: 
 
Although the following list is not exhaustive, those 
cases suggest that a police officer considering an 
arrest under s. 450(2) [now 495(2)] should keep the 
following factors in mind: 
(1) The criteria set out in s. 450(2) are not all-
embracing; 
(2) The public interest, having regard to all the 
circumstances, must be the main consideration; 
(3) In impaired driving cases a possible repetition 
of the offence must be the paramount concern 
because of the tragic results which may follow; 
(4) The officer must consider the mental and 
physical condition of the suspect; 
(5) In deciding whether to arrest, the officer may 
draw on his own experience, the experience of 
fellow  officers and the collective experience of the 
force; 
(6) He is entitled to arrest if he cannot satisfy 
himself that the suspect will not repeat the 
offence. 
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In Ware, the Court also recognized that some 
allowance must be given to an "on the street" 
application of public interest (as opposed to an 
application made in the comfort of a controlled 
environment like a police office): 
 
A court must take into account that the arrests 
took place at the scene. In those circumstances it is 
unrealistic to expect a police officer to apply the 
criteria set out in s.450(2) [now s.495(2)] with the 
same precision as he would in the relative calm of 
the police station. 
 
However, if the arrest is effected in the absence 
public interest being satisfied, once public interest 
is satisfied there is a requirement under s.497 of 
the Criminal Code to release the person  and 
compel court attendance through another method. 
 
The need to ensure the safety and security 
of the victim or witness to the offence.   
 
This element is absent from the considerations of 
public interest in s. 496 of the Criminal Code 
(release without arrest), however appear in ss. 497 
and 498 of the Criminal Code (release following 
arrest). It may be necessary to arrest a person to 
secure a victim’s or witness’ welfare or because of 
an apprehended threat to the safety and well 
being of a victim or witness to the offence. 
Conditional release with restrictions such as no 
contact orders or no attendance orders may be 
warranted to protect the victim or witness. 
 
Summary of  "public interest" includes the 
following: 
 
• the need to establish the identity of the 
person 
• the need to secure or preserve evidence of or 
in relation to the offence 
• the need to prevent the 
- continuation of the offence 
 - repetition of the offence 
 - the commission of another offence 
• the need to ensure the safety and security of 
any victim or witness to the offence 
 
Once an accused has been arrested, it is not a 
requirement of the Code for a police officer to 
"enumerate the reasons for the exercise of [their] 
discretion in holding an individual", although it may 
be preferable to advise the arrestee23.  
 
Policy Based Arrests 
 
A decision to arrest and detain should be based on 
reasons relating specifically to the individual24. An 
arrest based solely on policy (ie. the British 
Columbia Attorney General's Policy on violence 
against women) rather than for reasons pertaining 
to the individual is unlawful and arbitrary (contrary 
to s.9 of the Charter)25. It would be equally wrong 
for an individual police officer or police force to 
have a policy to arrest regardless of the 
circumstances26. However, the question on whether 
a detention will be arbitrary will not only be 
whether the arrest was based on policy, but also 
whether in fact s.495(2) of the Criminal Code was 
breached by the arrest not being reasonable in the 
public interest27. 
 
For example, in R. v. Hardt [1999] B.C.J. 1288 
(B.C.S.C.), the police arrested the accused for 
assault arising from a domestic circumstance. The 
accused argued that the "real reason" the arrest 
was made was to achieve policy objectives (the 
Attorney General's policy on spousal abuse) and 
the police were therefore not acting in the lawful 
execution of their duty. Justice Smith recognized 
that reference to policy considerations do not in 
all cases render an arrest arbitrary and may go to 
the officer's state of mind when assessing the 
validity of the arrest under s.495 of the Code. The 
Court held: 
 
The mere reference to "policy" does not mean that 
the arrest was motivated by general policy 
considerations rather than by specific reasonable 
and probable grounds causing the officer to believe 
the appellant had committed an indictable offence 
as required under s. 495(1).  Just as the police in 
                                                 
23 R. v. Ronnie [1999] B.C.J. No. 813 (B.C.Prov.Ct.) 
24 R. v. Pithart (1987) 34 C.C.C. (3d) 150 (B.C.Co. Crt.) 
25 See R. v. Venzi [1997] B.C.J. No. 3019 (B.C.S.C.), R. v. Faulkner (1988) 9 M.V.R. 
(2d) 137 (B.C.C.A.) 
26 See R. v. Ware (1987) 49 M.V.R. 97 (B.C.Co.Crt.) 
27 R. v. Cayer (1988) 6 M.V.R. (2d) 1 (Ont.C.A.) 
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the execution of their duty must bear in mind 
guidelines, for example, for the manner in which 
they inform accused persons of their rights under 
the Charter, they must also bear in mind guidelines 
or policies for the manner in which they conduct 
assessments under s. 495(1).   
          
COURT APPEARANCE 
 
In addition to "public interest", the peace officer 
must also consider whether, if released, the 
accused will appear in court.  
 
s.495(2)(e) Criminal Code 
A peace officer shall not arrest…in any case where 
(e)…he has no reasonable grounds to believe that, if he 
does not so arrest the person, the person will fail to 
attend court in order to be dealt with according to law. 
 
This provision places an affirmative duty on a 
police officer not to arrest unless the officer 
possesses the requisite grounds of belief. The 
information available to the police officer will 
determine whether there are reasonable grounds 
to believe that the person will not appear for 
court.  Criteria to be considered may include: 
 
• the offender states they will not attend court; 
• previous convictions for failing to appear in 
court; 
• outstanding warrants of arrest in other 
jurisdictions indicating the person's propensity 
to avoid the court jurisdiction; or 
• a person is so intoxicated that they may not 
recall the police officer speaking to them or 
understand the conditions of court attendance. 
 
As with public interest, if the arresting officer is 
justified in arresting to ensure court appearance 
and the situation changes (e.g. the intoxicated 
accused sobers and can now understand the charge 
and release), there is a continuing requirement for 
the arresting officer (and the officer in charge) to 
re-consider releasing the person and compelling 
their court attendance by another method.  
  
 
 
The Release “Ladder” 
 
In a sense, the continuing obligation to assess 
public interest and court appearance takes a 
“ladder” approach and each rung, or stage, involves 
its own assessment of the release criteria. 
 
 
 
Judge  
 
 
Justice  
 
 
Officer in Charge 
 
 
Arresting Officer 
 
 
 
PATROLS ON THE WILD SIDE: 
WHERE FACTS ARE OFTEN 
FUNNIER THAN FICTION   
Collected By Constable Ian Barraclough… 
 
Case of Mistaken Identity 
 
The BBC reported at the beginning of May that a 
police officer in Israel got more than he 
bargained for during a routine house call. In 
response to a noise complaint made by a 
neighbour, a young male police constable was 
dispatched to investigate. Upon arriving at the 
scene, he found himself amongst a crowd of 
female revellers celebrating a hen party. 
Unbeknown to the constable, the women had 
ordered a stripper to perform at their party and 
were expecting him to arrive when the constable 
knocked on the door. Furthermore, they had 
specifically requested that the entertainment 
company send them someone dressed as a police 
officer!  
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Suddenly finding himself the main attraction, the 
young constable had to start fending off the 
rowdy women who, honestly mistook the constable 
as a stripper, started to undress and caress him.  
One of the partygoers "took off my shirt and 
untied my shoelaces," the officer was quoted as 
saying by the Yedioth Ahronoth daily, "She 
started stroking me and called on her friends to 
join in." As a last resort, the constable pulled out 
his badge, but the party goers simply thought it 
was all part of the act. The police officer was 
reportedly only able to extricate himself when his 
partner called for back-up. The revellers were 
fined. [bbc.co.uk/news 05-05-03]. 
 
Finding the Safest Place to Hide 
 
Thirty two year old Troy C. Stephani was 
suspected of impaired driving while meandering 
along a road in his pick-up truck in Medford, New 
York. An officer from Suffolk County Park Police 
pulled the vehicle over due to his erratic driving, 
but when the officer walked up to the driver’s 
side of his truck, Stephani took off. A police 
chase ensued with Highway Patrol vehicles and 
cruisers dispatched from the County Police Fifth 
Precinct. Thinking that a “big building” complex 
would offer him safe refuge from the pursuing 
officers, Stephani pulled straight into the 
headquarters of the Suffolk County Police 
Department.  
 
"I guess he couldn't have made a worse turn," 
Sgt. Victor Webster, of the Suffolk County Park 
Police, said. "But it was good for us." 
 
Stephani not only tried to take refuge in the 
complex of the police headquarters, but he pulled 
into a driveway leading directly up to the 
department’s K-9 section, where he was cornered. 
Asked why he didn’t yield to the pursuing officers 
earlier, Stephani allegedly claimed he needed time 
to finish his crack cocaine. [Salon.com-AP, 04-28-
03]. 
 
 
 
Search Appeal Makes you Sick 
 
You have the right to remain silent, but what if 
you vomit evidence before police read you your 
rights? Connecticut's Supreme Court heard 
arguments in April on a rather fine point in 
"Miranda warning" law: whether the police can use 
a drug suspect's vomit against him (or at least 
use the eight bags of heroin that came up with 
the vomit). Arresting officers apparently asked 
suspect Vincent Betances if he had just swallowed 
heroin, and Betances (without a warning) said that 
he had, leading officers to summon medical help. 
Betance now says the officers' question was 
unconstitutional "interrogation," even though 
without immediate treatment, he could have died. 
The state Supreme Court is expected to issue a 
ruling this summer. [Hartford Courant, 04-23-03, 
Associated Press, 04-25-03]. 
 
From Police Blotters  
 
¾ (Washington Post, April 11) "Mount Olivet 
Road NE, 1200 block, March 30. An animal 
control officer responding to a call about a 
snake in a bathroom reported that the snake 
was actually a hair band."  
 
¾ Vancouver, Washington) Columbian, Jan. 7) "A 
Vancouver police officer was sent to a home 
in the 3100 block of S Street ... when a 
woman called 911 to say a group of 30 
cannibals from Yacolt were trying to break 
into her house. (Officers were unable to 
locate any cannibals."  
 
¾ (Grass Valley (Calif.) Union, March 30) "A 
Dorsey Drive convalescent facility reported 
that one Alzheimer's patient struck another 
Alzheimer's patient, but neither of them 
remembered the incident or wanted medical 
attention."   
 
[Chuck Shepherd's News of the Weird, Week of 
May 18, 2003, newsoftheweird.com]. 
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ODOUR OF ALCOHOL ON 
BREATH SUFFICIENT TO 
JUSTIFY ROADSIDE DEMAND 
R. v. Butchko, 2003 SKPC 76 
 
The police stopped a vehicle with 
three occupants after it was 
observed leave a liquor 
establishment, make a u-turn, 
accelerate, and fishtail. An odour of alcohol was 
detected coming from the vehicle. The driver was 
asked to step out of the vehicle and an officer 
detected a strong smell of alcohol on his breath. 
When asked if he had anything to drink the 
driver replied that he had not. The driver was 
read the roadside screening demand, but refused 
to provide a sample. After repeated unsuccessful 
attempts at gaining compliance to the demand, 
the officer charged the defiant and 
uncooperative accused with refusal.  
 
At his trial in Saskatchewan Provincial Court on 
the charge of refusing to provide an approved 
screening device sample, the accused submitted 
that the smell of alcohol on his breath, by itself, 
was insufficient in providing a reasonable 
suspicion that he had alcohol in his body and that 
the officer required additional objective indicia 
of consumption. The accused filed expert 
evidence that the smell of alcohol detected on a 
person’s breath may not be indicative of alcohol in 
the body as the ethanol may have been 
eliminated, while the chemical causing the odour 
has not. 
 
Section 254(2) of the Criminal Code allows a 
police officer to make a roadside demand if they 
reasonably suspect the driver has alcohol in their 
body. The legal threshold, reasonable suspicion, is 
low and does not require a belief that a crime has 
been committed. In concluding that the odour was 
sufficient to provide the necessary level of 
suspicion, Justice Whelan stated: 
 
I accept that the Officer genuinely possessed the 
suspicion and believed it to be reasonable. An 
objective scrutiny requires that I find the 
Officer’s suspicion was reasonable. I don’t believe 
that it requires that the Officer’s evidence be 
scrutinized in light of all the evidence before the 
Court. It’s sufficient to ask; whether a reasonable 
person, standing in the officer’s shoes, with the 
officer’s knowledge, would have had a reasonable 
suspicion.  
 
The accused was convicted for the refusal.  
 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org 
 
ARRANGING SERVICES 
AMOUNTS TO PROSTITUTION 
R. v. Petts, 2003 NBQB 102 
 
The accused stopped an 
undercover police officer on a 
public street and offered to 
arrange for a woman to perform 
a sexual act on the officer in exchange for $40. 
The accused provided the officer with an address 
and telephone number. Later a woman came out of 
the residence at the address provided and spoke 
to the officer. The accused was charged and 
convicted in New Brunswick Provincial Court of 
communicating with another person to obtain the 
sexual services of a prostitute. However, he 
appealed to the New Brunswick Court of Queen’s 
Bench arguing he was communicating not to 
“obtain” sexual services, but to “provide” them. In 
dismissing the appeal, Queen’s Bench Justice 
McLellan concluded the accused was “acting as an 
intermediary or broker between a prostitute and 
a potential customer”. The Court further stated: 
 
Here the accused stopped the undercover officer 
in a public place for the purpose of communicating 
with that officer that the accused could obtain 
the sexual services of a prostitute for that 
officer. I think the offence is established if an 
accused in such circumstances attempts to arrange 
the services of a prostitute for himself or for 
another person. 
 
Complete case available at  www.canlii.org 
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ENTRY TO PROTECT PROPERTY 
LOGICAL, LAUDABLE & LAWFUL 
R. v. Sanderson, 
(2003) Docket:C37434 (OntCA) 
 
The police met with a distraught 
young woman after receiving a 
911 call from her in the middle of 
the night. She reported that her 
boyfriend (the accused), at whose house she had 
been living, assaulted her and made threats 
concerning her dog and personal property. She 
was adamant about returning to the accused’s 
home and retrieving her personal belongings 
(clothes, cosmetics, furniture). Four police 
officers (including two trainees) went with her to 
the accused’s house. She let herself and the 
police in with a key. The accused was found inside 
standing in the bedroom doorway and was told by 
officers that they were there to keep the peace 
while the woman gathered her belongings and 
would then leave.  
 
He was also told they were there to investigate 
the allegations she made and that he could come 
with them voluntarily for questioning to the police 
station or otherwise they would seek an arrest 
warrant for the assault. The accused told the 
police to get a warrant, swore at them, and 
ordered them from the home. The woman wanted 
to retrieve some items from the bedroom, but 
the accused refused to move out of the doorway 
and continued to block entry despite several 
requests by the police to move. He was arrested 
for obstruction after being warned. He resisted 
arrest and a struggle ensued. Pepper spray was 
deployed and the accused was subsequently 
subdued.  
 
At trial the accused was convicted of the earlier 
offences respecting the altercation between 
himself and his girlfriend, but was acquitted of 
the obstruct and resist charges. In the trial 
judge’s view, once the police decided they would 
not arrest the accused at that time for the 
earlier altercation, the police “ought to have left 
the residence…and pursued alternate remedies to 
protect the property of the alleged victim”. A 
Crown appeal to the Ontario Superior Court of 
Justice was dismissed. The appeal court judge 
found that the police “should have exercised 
better judgment in this matter, there being no 
ongoing or continuing exigent circumstances 
following their unlawful entry.” The Crown 
appealed again, this time to the Ontario Court of 
Appeal.  
 
The Entry 
 
The Crown argued that the police were lawfully 
entitled to enter the accused’s residence 
because: 
 
1) the girlfriend, as occupier, had invited them 
in to assist her, and  
2) they were discharging their common law duty 
to preserve the peace and protect property.  
 
The accused submitted that the girlfriend was 
only a guest, not an occupant, and therefore did 
not have the authority to give consent to the 
entry. Although the Ontario Court of Appeal did 
not interfere with the trial judge’s finding that 
the girlfriend could not give the police permission 
to enter, both the common law and statutory 
duties imposed on the police to preserve the 
peace and protect property were engaged. In 
evaluating the common law powers and duties of 
the police, a two-stage enquiry (derived from the 
English case R. v. Waterfield, [1963] 3 All E.R. 
659 (C.C.A.)) was used: 
 
1) Did the police conduct fall within the general 
scope of any duty imposed by statute or 
recognized at common law? and 
 
2) Did the police conduct involve an unjustifiable 
use of powers associated with the general 
scope of that duty? 
 
In holding that the police entry was justified 
using the Waterfield test, Justice MacPherson, 
for the unanimous court, wrote: 
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The powers and duties of a peace officer emanate 
from common law and statute. The general duty of 
a peace officer is to preserve peace as it relates 
to the protection of life and property. 
 
And further: 
 
The officer’s were faced with a distraught woman 
in the middle of the night. She, and an independent 
witness, reported that she had been assaulted by 
the [accused]. She had left the residence in only 
her pyjamas and without footwear-on March 29. 
The altercation continued, and another assault 
took place, when the complainant returned to the 
house with [a friend] to retrieve her dog and 
personal belongings. After she left a second time, 
the [accused] followed her to [the friend’s] 
apartment where, in a heated exchange, he 
threatened to burn her personal belongings. 
 
Hearing all of this when they arrived, the police 
were fully justified, in my view, in deciding to go to 
the [accused’s] house and, accompanied by the 
complainant who told them that she lived there and 
had a key, to enter it. They were investigating 
several potential criminal offences and they had 
reason to believe that the [accused] would destroy 
the complainant’s personal property. Moreover, 
they wanted to assist the complainant with 
retrieving her clothing and personal belongings, and 
getting away from the [accused], so that she could 
proceed to her parents’ home… 
 
Justice MacPherson concluded the officer’s 
decision to go with the girlfriend to the accused’s 
residence was logical and laudable—“precisely 
what a distraught citizen would want and need 
from a police officer.”  
 
Police conduct inside residence 
 
Both lower court judgments concluded that the 
continued police presence once asked to leave, as 
well as the order to move from the doorway, was 
unlawful. Since the accused did not appear to be 
imminently endangering the property—he was not 
in the process of destroying it—other avenues to 
protect the property should have been pursued. 
The Ontario Court of Appeal disagreed. Justice 
MacPherson stated: 
 
The steps the police took inside the dwelling were 
directed to [prevent her belongings from being 
burned and to assist her in removing them from 
the dwelling]. If the [accused] had moved out of 
the bedroom doorway, the complainant, under the 
watchful eye of the police, could have safely 
removed her belongings (one purpose fulfilled) 
which in turn would have given the respondent no 
opportunity to burn them (the second purpose 
fulfilled). The police were fulfilling their common 
law and statutory duties of protecting property 
and assisting a victim of crime. The first stage of 
the Waterfield analysis has been met. 
 
In assessing the second stage of Waterfield, 
whether the conduct of the police involved a 
unjustifiable use of police powers associated with 
the duty of preserving the peace and protecting 
property, the Court held: 
 
…The police had been called to assist a distraught 
young woman in the middle of the night who, after 
being assaulted twice, had been forced to flee her 
boyfriend's residence, without any shoes, and 
wearing only her pyjamas. 
 
There have been significant and commendable 
changes in recent years in the response of 
Canadian police to domestic violence situations. 
There is now a much greater recognition by the 
police of both the extent and the seriousness of 
the problem, and the consequences for victims in 
the community, when the police fail to respond. 
Police officers are often the first persons called 
to respond in situations of domestic violence. In my 
view, it is very much in the public interest that the 
police, in the discharge of their public duties, be 
willing and able to assist victims of domestic 
violence with leaving their relationships and their 
residences safely and with their belongings. That 
is precisely what the police did in the present case. 
 
The actions of the police in the [accused’s] 
residence were geared to a justifiable use of their 
powers. Constable Paul explained to the [accused] 
that they would leave as soon as the complainant 
had retrieved her belongings. The complainant 
wished to enter the bedroom, which she used when 
she stayed at the [accused’s] residence, in order 
to get her clothes. When the [accused] refused to 
allow the complainant to enter the bedroom, the 
police were justified in ordering the [accused] to 
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move, and in arresting him for obstruction when he 
refused to comply. 
 
The Court also rejected the accused’s submission 
that the police should have followed a different 
course of action: 
 
I disagree with these suggestions about proper 
police behaviour in the context of a volatile 
domestic dispute. The suggestion that the police 
might have advised the complainant to do nothing 
until the morning ignores the facts that she had 
been assaulted to an extent that the police noticed 
a scratch mark under her eyes, that it was the 
middle of the night and she had only pyjamas, and 
that an angry boyfriend had just attacked her dog 
and threatened to burn all of her belongings. A 
suggestion by the police that neither they nor the 
complainant do anything until the morning would 
have been unhelpful and inappropriate. 
 
The officer’s actions were “logical, laudable and 
lawful.” The appeal was allowed, the acquittals on 
the obstruction and resist charges were quashed, 
and verdicts of guilty were entered. The matter 
was remitted back to the trial judge to impose 
sentence. 
 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca 
 
JUDGE ORDERS RETURN OF 
SEIZED DRUG PROPERTY 
Carlisle v. HMTQ, 2003 BCSC 632 
 
The police searched the 
applicant’s home by consent and 
found 51 marihuana plants, four 
high-pressure lights, a wooden 
pipe, and a container with a 
green substance. He was charged with possession 
for the purpose of trafficking and cultivation of 
marihuana. These charges were subsequently 
stayed after the applicant received an exemption 
under the Marihuana Medical Access Regulations 
(MMAR). He brought an application before the 
Supreme Court of British Columbia seeking a 
restitution order for the marihuana plants, dried 
marihuana, and equipment seized, as well as 
$10,000 in direct and indirect monetary 
restitution. He submitted that because the police 
seized his marihuana and equipment he was unable 
to grow his own and was therefore forced to buy 
it for as much as $200 a day from other sources.  
 
Justice Loo of the British Columbia Supreme 
Court noted that since the charges had been 
stayed, no forfeiture order had been made. She 
ordered the items seized from him be returned. 
However, the application for the monetary relief 
was adjourned for 60 days until the federal 
government has addressed the constitutional 
issues surrounding the MMAR.   
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca 
 
FINDING FUN IN FITNESS 
Cst. Kelly Keith 
 
Get your head in the game 
 
Have you ever been running 
or cycling and you've talked 
yourself into feeling tired.  
In any sport (especially 
endurance) your mind can be 
your biggest asset or your 
worst enemy. How you think and what you think 
about can and will affect the way you feel during 
your exercise.  What you think about can make 
the difference between winning or losing / 
enjoying or hating your training and have a big 
impact on your decision to stay with an exercise 
program. Become aware of what you are thinking 
about in your next event. 
 
What should you be thinking about????? 
 
Are you using Association Techniques (focusing on 
body sensations and monitoring any changes) or 
Dissociation Techniques (directing attention away 
from bodily sensations by a form of distraction)? 
 
So which is best?   
 
• Association may be linked to faster running 
times 23
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• Dissociation can reduce the sense of effort 
and awareness of physical sensations such as 
pain and fatigue - usually moderate to high 
intensity 
 
• Athletes of all levels appear to favour 
association in competition and dissociation in 
training 
 
• Elite athletes tend to use both strategies 
during endurance training and races and are 
able to switch between the two as required. 
 
You will need to decide which strategy is best for 
you in your personal situation, preferences, and 
goals.  For example Dissociation may benefit 
people who want to improve their endurance by 
running or exercising for longer periods of time 
at moderate intensities. 
 
Association may benefit an athlete who is trying 
to set an ideal pace for optimal performance.  
Association is also important in competition if you 
are able to monitor bodily responses to enable you 
to ride the thin line between pushing for 
maximum performance and overdoing it.  In 
Association you enter a concentrated state where 
you can react to changes within your body. I 
believe it is best to combine Associative and 
Dissociate thinking for longer runs, bike rides, 
etc. 
 
I enjoy listening to music while exercising.  The 
music I listen to bring positive emotions to me.  
However, last week I was riding up Mount 
Seymour and I felt sluggish so I turned to 
Dissociation techniques and starting singing (I 
had walkman on), but don't worry, I had my 
helmet and sunglasses on so no one knew me.  
Anyways, I couldn't beat the feeling so I went 
into Associative thinking and then realized that I 
was in 4th gear, which is why it was so hard!  The 
moral of the story - Don't be too quick to go into 
Dissociation thinking!!! 
 
 
 
 
Techniques for Dissociation: 
 
• Music - this can generate positive thoughts, 
improve your mood state and distract you 
from the physical demands of your sport; 
 
• Counting Game - Count the number of blue 
cars you see, or the number of dogs, post 
boxes etc....be inventive...; 
 
• Alphabet Game - Work through A to Z for a 
chosen category - (names, countries etc); 
 
• Active Fantasy - Imagine yourself as a 
lottery winner and decide how to spend your 
winnings 
 
Avoid thoughts relating to work or jobs you have 
to do and anything problematic as this can 
increase tension.  Try to be creative and have fun 
with Dissociation.  It can help you relax and enjoy 
your sport even more. 
 
Techniques for Association: 
 
• Focus on your breathing—controlled, 
relatively deep rhythmic breathing is the key 
to relaxation.  When you breathe out, try to 
imagine the tension leaving your body; 
 
• Try to remain relaxed while running, cycling, 
swimming etc., but be aware of tension and 
fatigue in your muscles.  It's often a good 
idea to start from the head and work down, 
giving each area or group of muscles your 
attention.  If you notice tension, try to focus 
on a cue word, such as "relax" or "easy" and 
try to let tension flow out of the muscles; 
 
• Keep your pace in line with the information 
you gain from monitoring your body.  You 
might, for example, increase the pace if you 
feel very positive. 
 
Repeat the monitoring constantly, or 
alternatively, take some time out for Dissociation.  
You might also reinforce your mood by telling 
yourself how well you are doing and that you need 
to keep working hard and remain focused. 
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Don't leave your psychological preparation to 
chance.  Remember that you control your 
thoughts, not the other way around.  The way you 
think is strongly linked to the way you perform.  
So if you want to perform better, gain greater 
control and enjoy your sport more, start planning 
today! 
 
(reference - Peak Performance News Letter) 
 
Summers Here - Stay Hydrated ! 
 
Staying hydrated is critical for optimal work-
outs.  The benefits of staying hydrated are 
endless. I will not bore you with them - however, 
whether you exercise or not staying hydrated is 
imperative to GOOD HEALTH. 
 
• Drink 2 glasses of water first thing in the 
morning 
 
• Drink during exercise 
 
• Attempt to drink 10 glasses of water every 
day 
 
• If you drink caffeinated/alcoholic drinks - 
drink one glass of water for every 
caffeinated/alcoholic drink, and these do not 
count for your regular 10 glasses 
 
• If you’re thirsty - you are partially 
dehydrated - don't allow yourself to get this 
way. 
 
Running Uphill/Downhill  
 
Running uphill and downhill are different in how 
they affect and condition the body.  They both 
offer some great training benefits, not to 
mention it is good to change up the intensity of 
your runs, your route, and add in hills. 
 
Downhill running will strengthen the muscles, 
improve your running economy and help develop 
speed, however the pounding your knee's and 
body take is also increased.  To avoid injury on 
running downhill, try to choose gradual slopes, 
and/or grass, and use short, quick strides to 
minimize landing shock and prevent muscle 
soreness. 
 
Uphill running is a great way to increase your 
cardio.  This can be a good way to get a very 
intense work-out in as little time as possible.  If 
you want to maximize your training and it's time 
to do a hill run, try this;  running up 10 % of the 
hill - back down to the bottom, run up 20 % of the 
hill and back down - I'm sure you get the picture - 
this is intense and not for the beginner !  
 
What is the best way to get past a fitness 
plateau? 
  
Change your work-out.  Variety is, in my opinion, 
the number "1” way to blast past a training 
plateau and keep you interested. This applies to 
all fitness, not just weightlifting.  If you usually 
run on the street - take a trail run once a week.  
If you’re usually a long distance cyclist, try 
putting wind sprints into your routine, or if you’re 
used to working certain body parts together, 
change them all up.  Take a look around and 
change work out plans with someone. Change 
everything up for six weeks and then go back to 
your regular routine for bit and see how you will 
improve.  You'll not only break your plateaus but 
you'll have increased interest !!!!! 
 
Cst. Kelly Keith is a 15-year police veteran. He 
served with the Winnipeg Police Service for 12 
years before moving to Victoria where he has 
been since. 
 
ROADSIDE SCREENING DEVICE 
DELAY TRIGGERS RIGHT TO 
COUNSEL 
R. v. Ritchie, 2003 SKQB 246 
 
At 2:30 am the police stopped 
the accused for turning right 
onto a highway from the wrong 
driving lane and for slowing down 
at an intersection even though there was a green 
light. At 2:35 am the accused was read the 25
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approved screening device demand. However, the 
police officer did not have a device with him and 
had to wait 10 minutes for one to be brought to 
the scene. The accused refused to provide a 
sample and he was charged with refusal. He was 
convicted at trial by the Saskatchewan Provincial 
Court but appealed to the Saskatchewan Court of 
Queen’s bench arguing that the demand was not 
proper and that he was denied his right to counsel 
under s.10(b) of the Charter when the police 
failed to inform him of his right to a lawyer 
before the roadside screening device arrived. 
 
Court of Queen’s Bench Justice MacDonald 
allowed the appeal and overturned the conviction. 
In the Court’s view the accused was detained 
when the officer assumed control over his 
movement by a direction or demand, which may 
have significant legal consequences and which 
prevented or impeded access to counsel. In this 
case, there was a delay between the making of 
the demand and the arrival of the device. The 
delay did not arise from exigencies, but from the 
unavailability of the roadside device.  
 
Section 254(2) of the Criminal Code requires that 
the sample be taken forthwith. Thus the delay in 
administering the test triggered the duty to 
inform the accused of his right to counsel. 
Justice MacDonald stated: 
 
While it is generally necessary, in order to ensure 
an accurate gauge of intoxication, to conduct a 
screening test as soon as possible after stopping 
the driver, there was in this situation, no urgency 
in the sense that the officers were able to inform 
the [accused] of his right to counsel when it 
became apparent that there would be a delay in 
administering the test. The officers had ample 
opportunity in the intervening minutes between the 
detention and the time that the screening device 
arrived to either inform the [accused] of his right 
to counsel, without any hardship being imposed 
upon them in doing so or to take the [accused] to 
the police station which was only two blocks away 
and administer the Borkenstein breathalyzer to 
him. 
 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org 
CLASS 91 GRADUATES 
 
The Police Academy is pleased to 
announce the successful graduation 
of recruit Class 91 as qualified 
municipal constables on June 6, 
2003. 
 
DELTA 
Cst. Robert Anzulovich 
Cst. Shaun Begg 
Cst. Ryan Jeffrey  
 
 
NEW WESTMINSTER  
Cst. Wendy Bowyer 
Cst. Nicholas Ferguson 
 
 
SAANICH 
Cst. William Dodds 
Cst. Leanne Montgomery 
Cst. Martin Steen 
 
VANCOUVER 
Cst. Rodney Buysse 
Cst. Peter Froh 
Cst. Burinder Gill 
Cst. Lene Jensen 
Cst. Jason Lawrence 
Cst. David Marsh 
Cst. Barbara Martens 
Cst. Colin McLachlen 
Cst. Ryan Perry 
Cst. Robert Phoenix 
Cst. Michael Rowe 
Cst. Baljinder Singh 
Cst. Benjamin Stevens 
Cst. Greig Vandenberg 
Cst. Michael Wheeler 
Cst. Christine Wohlleben 
Cst Thomas Zwissler 
 
Congratulations to Cst. Ryan Jeffrey 
(Delta), who was the recipient of the 
British Columbia Association of 
Chiefs of Police Shield of Merit for 
best all around recruit performance 
in basic training. Cst. Benjamin Stevens 
(Vancouver) received the Abbotsford Police 
Association Oliver Thomson Trophy for 
outstanding physical fitness. Cst. William Dodds 
(Saanich), Cst. Peter Froh (Vancouver), Cst. 
Baljinder Singh (Vancouver) and Cst. Thomas 
Zwissler (Vancouver) received the Vancouver Police 
Union Excellence in Academics award for best 
academic test results in all disciplines. Cst. William 
Dodds (Saanich) received the British Columbia 
Federation of Police Officers Valedictorian award 
for being selected by his peers to represent his 
class at the graduation ceremony. Cst. Martin 
Steen (Saanich) was the recipient of the 
Abbotsford Police Recruit Marksmanship award 
k 3 for highest qualification score during Bloc26
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training (50/50). Vancouver Police Chief Constable 
Jamie Graham was the keynote speaker at the 
ceremony. 
 
LEADERSHIP: LOOKING 
BEYOND PERSONALITY 
Sgt. Mike Novakowski 
 
Faced with crisis, the man of character falls 
back upon himself 
Charles Degaulle. 
 
At its core, the trait theory of leadership 
focuses on individualized and enduring personal 
characteristics (physical, mental, emotional, and 
social attributes) that differentiate leaders from 
non-leaders. Leaders that exhibit these 
observable traits are “admired” (or idolized) by 
others28. Trait theory is “content” focused (what 
leader’s are) and little attention is paid to the 
leaders actions (what leader’s do)29. In contrast, 
an authentic and virtue based approach to 
leadership focuses on the ideal of “goodness”; 
conformity to moral and ethical principles. It is 
not just doing the right thing (virtuous action), 
but also being the right kind of person (virtuous 
character)30. Examples of virtues that embody 
leadership include honesty, courage31, and 
humility32. Thus, is a virtue-based approach to 
leadership theory a mere variation of a trait 
theory, or does it involve considerations beyond 
personality?  
  
If one looks at the premise of the trait theory, it 
is evident that a leader could possess the 
personality traits of a promising leader, yet little 
                                                 
28 Hallman, Steve. Leadership Matters: Research About Leadership is Important. 
[On-line] Available: http://www.uakron.edu/cba/lead/tools.html. [2001, October 
25] 
29 Allen, Gemmy. (1998). Leading. [On-line] Available: 
http://ollie.dcccd.edu/mgmt1374book_ contents/4directing/leading/lead.htm 
[2001, October 25]; Taylor, Pat.(1994). Leadership in Education. Emergency 
Librarian, Vol. 21 Issue 3, p.9. Available: Academic Search FullTEXT EBSCOhost 
[2001, October 25] 
30 Harman, Gilbert. (1999). Virtue Ethics Without Character Traits. [On-line] 
Available: http://www.cogsci.princeton.edu/~ghh/Thomson.html [2001, October26] 
31 Lashway, Larry. (1996). Ethical Leadership. [On-line] Available: 
http://eric.uoregon.edu/publications/digests/digets107.html [2001, October 26] 
32 Wagner, Captain Daniel R. (1999) The Lost Virtue of Leadership. U.S. Naval 
Institute Proceedings, Vol. 125 Issue 9, p.96 Available: Academic Search FullTEXT 
EBSCOhost [2001, October 25] 
or no virtuous qualities. Stephen Covey found that 
up until World War I, success was founded in 
“character ethic”, representative of such virtues 
as integrity, humility, fidelity, courage, and 
justice. After World War I, a paradigm shift to a 
“personality ethic” was observed where success 
became a function of image, attitude, behaviour, 
and skills “that lubricate the processes of human 
interaction”33. Traits such as age, height, “good 
looks”, confidence, desire to lead, or even the “Big 
Five” model (surgency, dependability, 
agreeableness, adjustment, and intelligence)34 
have little, if anything to do with virtue.  
 
Virtue based leadership, in contrast, provides a 
“moral compass” from which the common good and 
personal development are best served. 
Contemporary leaders who “engender virtue in 
self, others and society through example and 
virtuous conduct” will stimulate transformational 
leadership35. Although a person who practices 
virtue-based leadership may possess many of the 
physical, personality, or ability attributes that 
embody the trait theory, virtue-based leadership 
involves considerations beyond personality traits 
to include moral or ethical qualities which are not 
captured by trait theory. It’s more about having 
and demonstrating character, than being one!!! 
 
In Leadership, character matters 
Gerald Bass 
 
Note-able Quote 
 
The Ten Commandments contain 297 words. The 
Bill of Rights is stated in 463 words. Lincoln’s  
Gettysburg Address contains 266 words. A 
recent federal directive to regulate the price of 
cabbage contains 26,911 words.—The Atlanta 
Journal 
                                                 
33 Covey, Stephen. (1990). The Seven Habits of Highly Effective People: Restoring 
the Character Ethic. New York, NY: Simon and Schuster Inc. 
34 Yukl, Gary. (2002). Leadership in Organizations. Upper Saddle River, N.J.: 
Prentice-Hall, Inc. 
35 Bass, Bernard M., & Steidlmeier, Paul (1999). Ethics, Character, and Authentic 
Transformational Leadership Behaviour. Leadership Quarterly, Vol. 10 Issue 2, 
p181. Available: Academic Search FullTEXT EBSCOhost [2001, October 25] 
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A LOUSY COP 
Author unknown 
 
Dear Mr./Mrs. Citizen 
 
Well, I guess you have figured me 
out. I seem to fit neatly into the 
category you place me in.  I'm 
stereotyped, characterized, 
standardized, classified, grouped, 
and always typical. I AM THE 
LOUSY COP. 
 
Unfortunately, the reverse isn't true. I can never 
figure you out. From birth you teach your children 
that I am a person to beware of. Then, you are 
shocked when they identify me with my 
traditional enemy....the criminal. 
 
You accuse me of coddling juveniles, until I catch 
your kid doing something wrong. 
 
You take an hour lunch, and several coffee breaks 
each day, then, point me out as a loafer if you see 
me have just one cup. 
 
You pride yourself on your polished manners, but 
think nothing of interrupting my meals at noon 
with your troubles. 
 
You raise hell about the guy who cuts you off in 
traffic, but, let me catch you doing the same 
thing, and all of a sudden I am picking on you. 
 
You know ALL the traffic laws, but never got one 
single ticket you deserved. 
 
You shout "Abuse of Authority" if you see me 
driving fast to an emergency call, but raise nine 
kinds of hell if I take more than 30 seconds 
responding to yours. 
 
You call it "Part of my job" if someone hits me, 
but yell "Police brutality" if I strike back. 
 
You would never think of telling your dentist how 
to pull a badly decayed tooth, or your doctor how 
to take out your appendix, but you are ALWAYS 
willing to give me pointers on how to be a police 
officer. 
 
You talk to me in a manner, and use language that 
would assure a bloody nose from anyone else, but 
you expect me to stand there and take your 
verbal abuse without batting an eye. 
 
You cry, "Something has to be done about crime", 
but you can't be bothered to get involved. 
 
You have no use for me what so ever, but of 
course, it's OK for me to change a tire for your 
wife, or deliver your baby in the back seat of my 
patrol car enroute to the hospital, or save your 
sons life with CPR and mouth to mouth 
resuscitation, or even forsake time with MY 
family working long hours overtime trying to find 
your lost daughter. 
 
So, dear citizen, you stand there on your soapbox 
and rant and rave about the way I do my job, 
calling me every name in the book, but, never stop 
a minute to think that your property, your family, 
and maybe your life might someday depend on one 
thing......ME. 
 
 Respectfully,  
 
A Lousy Cop 
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Sgt. Mike Novakowski at the JIBC Police 
Academy at (604) 528-5733 or e-mail 28
mnovakowski@jibc.bc.ca 
